1 00:00:03,379 --> 00:00:06,034 Helios 522, do you read? 2 00:00:06,137 --> 00:00:07,551 High above Athens, 3 00:00:07,655 --> 00:00:11,275 fighter jets track a 737 as it circles the city. 4 00:00:13,379 --> 00:00:15,689 522, do you read? Over. 5 00:00:15,793 --> 00:00:19,000 There's no answer from the passenger plane, 6 00:00:19,103 --> 00:00:21,000 but there is someone at the controls. 7 00:00:23,068 --> 00:00:25,517 More than a hundred people are on board. 8 00:00:25,620 --> 00:00:29,103 Everybody's mind was going to hijack or terrorist. 9 00:00:29,206 --> 00:00:32,310 There is one person moving in the cockpit. 10 00:00:32,413 --> 00:00:33,827 Repeat there is one person... 11 00:00:33,931 --> 00:00:35,689 What happened to the crew and passengers? 12 00:00:37,172 --> 00:00:39,724 522, do you read? Over. 13 00:00:39,827 --> 00:00:42,586 And who is flying the plane? 14 00:00:42,689 --> 00:00:45,068 Helios 522, do you read? Over. 15 00:01:06,344 --> 00:01:13,448 Early morning, August the 14th, 2005. 16 00:01:15,620 --> 00:01:19,551 The cabin crew of Helios Airways flight 522 are preparing 17 00:01:19,655 --> 00:01:22,758 for their trip from the island of Cyprus to Athens, Greece. 18 00:01:22,862 --> 00:01:26,448 Sure is a beautiful day. 19 00:01:29,103 --> 00:01:30,206 Maybe I shouldn't have come in. 20 00:01:30,310 --> 00:01:34,793 Andreas Prodromou is twenty-five. 21 00:01:34,896 --> 00:01:36,724 He isn't supposed to be working today 22 00:01:36,827 --> 00:01:38,655 but he's taken the flight to spend some time 23 00:01:38,758 --> 00:01:41,172 with his girlfriend, who also works for Helios. 24 00:01:41,275 --> 00:01:44,827 It's the sort of day I'd like to be out flying. 25 00:01:44,931 --> 00:01:46,827 You will Andreas. 26 00:01:46,931 --> 00:01:50,275 Prodromou is a flight attendant now 27 00:01:50,379 --> 00:01:52,413 but he has bigger plans. 28 00:01:52,517 --> 00:01:54,689 One day he wants to fly for Helios. 29 00:01:56,655 --> 00:02:02,275 His dream was to become a professional pilot. 30 00:02:03,551 --> 00:02:07,551 Personally, I wanted him to stay in the family business. 31 00:02:07,655 --> 00:02:10,379 We often talked about this. We've got company. 32 00:02:10,482 --> 00:02:17,965 Stay warm in the back. See you in Athens. 33 00:02:18,068 --> 00:02:28,896 In the cockpit, the flight crew is occupied 34 00:02:29,000 --> 00:02:31,724 with the daily routine of preparing their jet for takeoff. 35 00:02:31,827 --> 00:02:34,551 It's bright today. 36 00:02:34,655 --> 00:02:38,241 09 Captain Hans Merten is an East German, 37 00:02:38,344 --> 00:02:41,586 a contract pilot hired by Helios for the busy holiday season. 38 00:02:41,689 --> 00:02:44,896 Are you almost through? Pardon? 39 00:02:45,000 --> 00:02:51,827 Are you almost done? Nearly. 40 00:02:53,655 --> 00:02:57,413 His co-pilot is from Cyprus. 41 00:02:57,517 --> 00:02:59,241 Pambos Charalambous has been working 42 00:02:59,344 --> 00:03:01,862 exclusively for Helios for the last five years. 43 00:03:03,517 --> 00:03:06,689 Before beginning any flight, crews are required to perform 44 00:03:06,793 --> 00:03:09,413 dozens of checks on various pieces of onboard equipment. 45 00:03:09,517 --> 00:03:12,793 It's a routine but necessary procedure. 46 00:03:12,896 --> 00:03:15,103 Doors closed. 47 00:03:15,206 --> 00:03:21,724 Sorry. Could you store trays and put your seat back. 48 00:03:21,827 --> 00:03:24,482 Helios is a charter airline, 49 00:03:24,586 --> 00:03:26,965 with low cost fares to Greece. 50 00:03:27,068 --> 00:03:31,068 It's a summer weekend, and the plane is filled with families. 51 00:03:31,172 --> 00:03:33,620 In all, there are 1-hundred and fifteen passengers 52 00:03:33,724 --> 00:03:34,689 on the morning flight. 53 00:03:34,793 --> 00:03:37,827 If you need any more help, let me know. 54 00:03:37,931 --> 00:03:40,896 We're just about to take off. 55 00:03:41,000 --> 00:03:42,379 They are low fare, no thrills. 56 00:03:42,482 --> 00:03:46,000 Uh they don't even serve you refreshments 57 00:03:46,103 --> 00:03:49,413 during small sorts of flights. 58 00:03:49,517 --> 00:03:53,896 But they often another possibility 59 00:03:54,000 --> 00:03:55,931 for the budget minded traveler. 60 00:03:56,034 --> 00:03:59,931 Paros Demetriou and Maria Rikkou 61 00:04:00,034 --> 00:04:02,551 are traveling to the Greek island of Patros. 62 00:04:02,655 --> 00:04:03,827 They've just got engaged. 63 00:04:03,931 --> 00:04:11,310 They booked, they booked this holiday a month, 64 00:04:11,413 --> 00:04:13,379 or more than a month ago. 65 00:04:13,482 --> 00:04:14,689 It was like a honeymoon for them. 66 00:04:16,896 --> 00:04:18,655 Flight attendants, please take your seats. 67 00:04:18,758 --> 00:04:20,827 Prepare for takeoff. 68 00:04:28,586 --> 00:04:31,068 Just a few minutes after nine in the morning, 69 00:04:31,172 --> 00:04:35,241 Helios Airways flight 522 lifts off into the bright sunshine. 70 00:04:35,344 --> 00:04:41,034 Nicosia area control, this is Helios 522. 71 00:04:42,758 --> 00:04:46,965 Request cruising at 3-4-0. 72 00:04:48,241 --> 00:04:51,344 Helios 522, you are cleared to climb to 3-4-0. 73 00:04:51,448 --> 00:04:53,551 Have a good day. 74 00:04:53,655 --> 00:04:56,172 Set 3-4-0. 3-4-0. 75 00:04:59,862 --> 00:05:02,758 Minutes into the flight, 76 00:05:02,862 --> 00:05:05,758 the plane is still climbing towards its cruising altitude. 77 00:05:07,896 --> 00:05:10,068 Suddenly, an alarm blares in the cockpit. 78 00:05:12,310 --> 00:05:15,206 What is it? 79 00:05:15,310 --> 00:05:16,206 The takeoff config warning? 80 00:05:16,310 --> 00:05:19,034 The flight crew is confused. 81 00:05:19,137 --> 00:05:20,827 The takeoff configuration alarm 82 00:05:20,931 --> 00:05:23,172 normally only sounds on the ground. 83 00:05:23,275 --> 00:05:25,793 It tells pilots their jet isn't ready for takeoff. 84 00:05:27,413 --> 00:05:29,517 The crew doesn't know why it's sounding now. 85 00:05:31,724 --> 00:05:34,620 Uncertain what the problem is, the captain radios 86 00:05:34,724 --> 00:05:38,275 the Helios operations center at Larnaka Airport back in Cyprus. 87 00:05:38,379 --> 00:05:43,413 Operations, this is flight 522. Over. 88 00:05:43,517 --> 00:05:46,206 Flight 522, what can I do for you? 89 00:05:46,310 --> 00:05:49,482 We have a takeoff config warning on. 90 00:05:49,586 --> 00:05:51,034 Pardon? 91 00:05:51,137 --> 00:05:54,103 Our takeoff config warning is on. 92 00:05:54,206 --> 00:06:00,275 I'm sure it's nothing. 93 00:06:00,379 --> 00:06:04,517 I'll let you know when we level off. 94 00:06:04,620 --> 00:06:07,517 With the first alarm still beeping in the cockpit, 95 00:06:07,620 --> 00:06:10,137 things become even more confusing. 96 00:06:10,241 --> 00:06:13,172 Their master caution alarm goes off. 97 00:06:13,275 --> 00:06:16,310 It could indicate that some systems onboard are overheating. 98 00:06:16,413 --> 00:06:19,275 We now have a master caution. 99 00:06:19,379 --> 00:06:21,931 I'll get you an engineer, 522. Just a minute. 100 00:06:22,034 --> 00:06:28,896 I find him very hard to understand. 101 00:06:29,000 --> 00:06:29,793 His accent is quite thick. 102 00:06:31,896 --> 00:06:33,758 Flight 522, what can I do for you? 103 00:06:33,862 --> 00:06:39,172 The ventilation cooling fan lights are off. 104 00:06:39,275 --> 00:06:41,689 Sorry. Can you repeat? 105 00:06:41,793 --> 00:06:44,724 While the pilots and ground engineers 106 00:06:44,827 --> 00:06:47,103 try to troubleshoot the two alarms, 107 00:06:47,206 --> 00:06:50,586 most passengers have no idea there's a problem until... 108 00:06:50,689 --> 00:06:57,862 Everyone stay calm. Please remain seated. 109 00:06:57,965 --> 00:07:01,931 Everyone please put the oxygen 110 00:07:02,034 --> 00:07:04,689 masks on completely over your mouth and nose. 111 00:07:04,793 --> 00:07:11,586 The protocol was immediately to secure yourself, 112 00:07:11,689 --> 00:07:13,793 grab an oxygen mask, stay in your seat. 113 00:07:13,896 --> 00:07:16,620 If you can help passengers without getting up, 114 00:07:16,724 --> 00:07:18,689 you could help them and you should help them. 115 00:07:18,793 --> 00:07:22,172 But you would not risk the safety of any cabin crew member 116 00:07:22,275 --> 00:07:24,965 to go and help a passenger which is five or six rows further up. 117 00:07:25,068 --> 00:07:30,034 Their procedure would be to grab their mask, 118 00:07:30,137 --> 00:07:37,000 don it, and wait for the aircraft to level off or 119 00:07:37,103 --> 00:07:38,275 commence with a descent. 120 00:07:38,379 --> 00:07:42,103 No one in the cabin knows what the problem is. 121 00:07:43,620 --> 00:07:45,379 They're waiting for information from the cockpit. 122 00:07:48,379 --> 00:07:50,655 The pilots are unaware that the oxygen masks 123 00:07:50,758 --> 00:07:52,241 in the cabin have dropped. 124 00:07:52,344 --> 00:07:55,206 And they still don't know why their takeoff configuration 125 00:07:55,310 --> 00:07:58,068 warning is on or why their systems are overhearing. 126 00:07:59,620 --> 00:08:02,862 Both of my equipment cooling lights are off. 127 00:08:02,965 --> 00:08:08,137 This is normal. Can you please confirm your problem? 128 00:08:08,241 --> 00:08:10,206 But the engineer on the ground is struggling 129 00:08:10,310 --> 00:08:12,793 to get a clear picture of what's happening in the air. 130 00:08:12,896 --> 00:08:15,241 They are not switched off! 131 00:08:15,344 --> 00:08:17,103 Can you confirm 132 00:08:17,206 --> 00:08:21,344 that the pressurization panel is set to auto? 133 00:08:21,448 --> 00:08:24,448 Where are my equipment cooling circuit breakers? 134 00:08:24,551 --> 00:08:30,275 Behind the captain's seat. Can you see them? 135 00:08:30,379 --> 00:08:31,758 What's going on? 136 00:08:31,862 --> 00:08:36,517 There's something wrong with the electrics on 522. 137 00:08:36,620 --> 00:08:38,137 I had something to pick up 138 00:08:38,241 --> 00:08:40,482 from operations so I was, I was there. 139 00:08:40,586 --> 00:08:46,310 I figured, oh not again. One of our problems. So I left. 140 00:08:46,413 --> 00:08:48,758 Well good luck. 141 00:08:48,862 --> 00:08:52,000 The problem doesn't seem serious, 142 00:08:52,103 --> 00:08:55,172 but as the plane continues to climb, passengers still 143 00:08:55,275 --> 00:08:57,586 haven't received any information from the cockpit. 144 00:08:57,689 --> 00:09:03,241 Helios 522, can you see the circuit breakers? 145 00:09:03,344 --> 00:09:06,758 And now the engineer on the ground 146 00:09:06,862 --> 00:09:09,000 loses contact with the aircraft. 147 00:09:09,103 --> 00:09:14,310 Helios 522, can you hear me? 148 00:09:14,413 --> 00:09:18,896 It's less than 30 minutes after take-off. 149 00:09:19,000 --> 00:09:21,344 And flight 522 is still on course. 150 00:09:24,551 --> 00:09:27,586 The plane is high above the Mediterranean Sea - 151 00:09:27,689 --> 00:09:29,931 and headed straight towards Athens. 152 00:09:35,931 --> 00:09:37,862 August the 14th, 2005. 153 00:09:37,965 --> 00:09:43,482 A Helios Airways 737 with 1-hundred and twenty-one people 154 00:09:43,586 --> 00:09:46,172 onboard is circling in the sky near Athens. 155 00:09:46,275 --> 00:09:51,586 Helios 522, can you hear me? 156 00:09:51,689 --> 00:09:55,000 Shortly after leaving the island of Cyprus, 157 00:09:55,103 --> 00:09:58,344 two different alarms had been triggered on the plane. 158 00:09:58,448 --> 00:10:00,000 The flight crew was trying to solve 159 00:10:00,103 --> 00:10:02,137 the problem with the help of ground engineers. 160 00:10:04,793 --> 00:10:08,413 But now radio contact with the plane has been lost. 161 00:10:08,517 --> 00:10:10,689 Air traffic control can't get any response 162 00:10:10,793 --> 00:10:12,413 from the captain or co-pilot. 163 00:10:15,034 --> 00:10:17,724 The flight to Greece normally takes an hour and a half 164 00:10:19,206 --> 00:10:22,241 but the passenger jet has been in the air for over two hours, 165 00:10:22,344 --> 00:10:23,896 circling in a holding pattern. 166 00:10:24,000 --> 00:10:29,655 We heard that there was an airplane which was 167 00:10:29,758 --> 00:10:35,551 flying into Greek territory and had no communication. 168 00:10:35,655 --> 00:10:39,931 Everybody's mind was going to hijack or to terrorist. 169 00:10:40,034 --> 00:10:47,344 More than 3-million people live in Athens. 170 00:10:47,448 --> 00:10:49,103 A plane slamming into the city 171 00:10:49,206 --> 00:10:51,482 could cause an incredible loss of life. 172 00:10:51,586 --> 00:10:55,724 This is a runaway aircraft. 173 00:10:55,827 --> 00:10:59,241 It's a possible hijacking or it's a possible terrorist act 174 00:10:59,344 --> 00:11:01,172 so let's involve the military. 175 00:11:01,275 --> 00:11:06,000 The Greek air force scrambles two of its most 176 00:11:06,103 --> 00:11:09,896 sophisticated fighter jets to investigate the Helios plane. 177 00:11:10,000 --> 00:11:11,344 Helios 522, do you read? Over. 178 00:11:11,448 --> 00:11:16,000 But the pilots aren't getting any response. 179 00:11:17,206 --> 00:11:20,310 One of the jets flies closer to the cockpit. 180 00:11:20,413 --> 00:11:24,793 Someone is in the co-pilot's seat, slumped over the controls. 181 00:11:24,896 --> 00:11:29,448 But there's no sign of the captain at all. 182 00:11:29,551 --> 00:11:33,206 The fighter pilot radios air traffic control in Athens. 183 00:11:33,310 --> 00:11:34,655 Athinai ACC, 184 00:11:34,758 --> 00:11:39,275 there's one figure in the cockpit of Helios 522. 185 00:11:39,379 --> 00:11:45,103 He appears non-responsive. Athinai ACC, checking the cabin. 186 00:11:45,206 --> 00:11:49,551 He can see passengers in their seats, 187 00:11:49,655 --> 00:11:51,931 but none of them react to the presence of the jet. 188 00:12:00,793 --> 00:12:03,344 Then, the pilot sees someone moving in the cockpit. 189 00:12:06,448 --> 00:12:07,620 Athinai Control. 190 00:12:07,724 --> 00:12:10,275 There is one person moving in the cockpit of Helios 522. 191 00:12:10,379 --> 00:12:14,965 Repeat there is one person inside the cockpit. 192 00:12:15,068 --> 00:12:20,206 Helios, 522 do you read? Over. Helios 522. Over. 193 00:12:20,310 --> 00:12:26,103 Flight HCY 522, this is Athinai radar control. 194 00:12:26,206 --> 00:12:28,965 The F-16s continue shadowing the jet, 195 00:12:29,068 --> 00:12:31,241 but there's no response at all from the cockpit. 196 00:12:31,344 --> 00:12:34,379 One of them was actually 197 00:12:34,482 --> 00:12:37,931 in a shooting position behind the 737. 198 00:12:38,034 --> 00:12:40,206 The other one was nearby the cockpit and he was 199 00:12:40,310 --> 00:12:42,862 trying to communicate visually with the person in the cockpit. 200 00:12:42,965 --> 00:12:47,000 Suddenly, the 737 turns left 201 00:12:47,103 --> 00:12:49,655 and begins to quickly descend. 202 00:12:49,758 --> 00:12:52,517 Athinai ACC. Helios 522 turning sharply. 203 00:12:53,758 --> 00:12:54,724 Following down. 204 00:12:54,827 --> 00:12:58,724 From more than 10-thousand meters, 205 00:12:58,827 --> 00:13:00,655 the plane drops towards the ground. 206 00:13:00,758 --> 00:13:04,862 There is no structural failure. There is no fire. 207 00:13:04,965 --> 00:13:07,724 There is no problem, obvious problem, 208 00:13:07,827 --> 00:13:09,206 from the external view with the plane. 209 00:13:10,931 --> 00:13:13,034 Helios 522. Over. Do you read? 210 00:13:14,793 --> 00:13:17,103 Helios 522, do you read? Over. 211 00:13:20,551 --> 00:13:23,413 Then 21-hundred meters above the ground, 212 00:13:23,517 --> 00:13:24,931 the person in the captain's seat 213 00:13:25,034 --> 00:13:27,655 acknowledges the fighter jet for the very first time. 214 00:13:30,137 --> 00:13:31,689 But no words are exchanged. 215 00:13:34,965 --> 00:13:37,724 Neither the fighter pilot nor local air traffic control 216 00:13:37,827 --> 00:13:39,655 can make radio contact with the jet. 217 00:13:43,448 --> 00:13:46,068 Just after twelve o'clock, almost three hours 218 00:13:46,172 --> 00:13:48,827 after it took off from the island of Cyprus, 219 00:13:48,931 --> 00:13:51,827 Helios flight 522 slams into the ground. 220 00:14:03,827 --> 00:14:06,931 Athinai ACC. Helios 522 is down. 221 00:14:08,241 --> 00:14:14,000 Repeat Helios 522 is down on Grammatiko Hill. Over. 222 00:14:14,103 --> 00:14:21,206 Fire and rescue workers rush to the crash site. 223 00:14:21,310 --> 00:14:22,482 There are no survivors. 224 00:14:27,275 --> 00:14:30,137 Flight attendant Lazaros Temetzian is stunned by what 225 00:14:30,241 --> 00:14:32,241 he hears at the company's operations center. 226 00:14:32,344 --> 00:14:39,137 It was the most chaotic scene I've ever seen. 227 00:14:42,000 --> 00:14:47,758 When I went back, our operations controller said that he 228 00:14:47,862 --> 00:14:52,586 lost the aircraft and his eyes, he started to cry. 229 00:14:52,689 --> 00:14:59,379 Helios is a small company, with just three jets. 230 00:14:59,482 --> 00:15:02,517 Members of the cabin crew have been working together for years. 231 00:15:05,620 --> 00:15:07,275 For Paul Symeonides, 232 00:15:07,379 --> 00:15:10,448 news of the crash is particularly terrifying. 233 00:15:10,551 --> 00:15:14,137 He's a flight attendant for the airline, and so is his fiancée. 234 00:15:14,241 --> 00:15:18,068 I think that must have been the worst thirty minutes 235 00:15:18,172 --> 00:15:19,931 of my life following that first image 236 00:15:20,034 --> 00:15:23,275 because Victoria was flying that morning to Glasgow. 237 00:15:23,379 --> 00:15:25,241 I had everyone and his brother, 238 00:15:25,344 --> 00:15:28,551 every person we knew was calling me up to find out if I'm alive, 239 00:15:28,655 --> 00:15:31,379 if Victoria's alive, what happened, why it happened. 240 00:15:31,482 --> 00:15:35,724 At first we said it takes one hour and a half 241 00:15:35,827 --> 00:15:38,758 to go to Greece, so probably it's not that plane 242 00:15:38,862 --> 00:15:45,482 and it took about two or three hours later to know that 243 00:15:45,586 --> 00:15:48,379 Paros and Maria was on the plane that crashed. 244 00:15:48,482 --> 00:15:54,379 Andreas Prodromou's father didn't know his son 245 00:15:54,482 --> 00:15:56,275 had been called to fill in on Flight 522. 246 00:16:00,793 --> 00:16:04,275 I was told that a Helios aircraft was 247 00:16:04,379 --> 00:16:08,793 lost by radar and air controllers couldn't contact it. 248 00:16:08,896 --> 00:16:13,896 I got worried. I called Andreas' phone. 249 00:16:14,000 --> 00:16:17,241 He always had it on and unfortunately 250 00:16:17,344 --> 00:16:17,931 he wouldn't answer. 251 00:16:20,137 --> 00:16:21,344 After that phone call, 252 00:16:21,448 --> 00:16:25,413 I felt as if the ground was pulled out from under my feet. 253 00:16:25,517 --> 00:16:33,241 It's the worst air crash in the history of Greece. 254 00:16:33,344 --> 00:16:35,413 Most of the 1-hundred and twenty-one victims 255 00:16:35,517 --> 00:16:36,379 are from Cyprus. 256 00:16:37,655 --> 00:16:39,724 The small island nation declares three 257 00:16:39,827 --> 00:16:41,689 days of mourning following the crash. 258 00:16:46,034 --> 00:16:48,379 It's an eerie disaster. 259 00:16:48,482 --> 00:16:50,862 For over an hour, air traffic controllers watched 260 00:16:50,965 --> 00:16:54,517 the passenger jet fly in radio silence closer and closer 261 00:16:54,620 --> 00:16:58,137 to Athens with no idea what was happening inside the jet. 262 00:17:01,793 --> 00:17:03,758 Now, piece by piece, 263 00:17:03,862 --> 00:17:05,793 investigators are trying to find out. 264 00:17:05,896 --> 00:17:10,931 So we climbed over the hill and there we were, 265 00:17:11,034 --> 00:17:13,827 you know, facing this situation 266 00:17:13,931 --> 00:17:16,862 which was beyond any, any description. 267 00:17:16,965 --> 00:17:20,448 I saw a great area in front of me which was burning, 268 00:17:20,551 --> 00:17:27,586 it was black, burning, people spread, pieces of the airplane. 269 00:17:32,689 --> 00:17:35,896 It is a truly nightmarish sight. 270 00:17:36,000 --> 00:17:38,413 I hope that I never experience it again. 271 00:17:40,068 --> 00:17:42,482 It was terrible, just terrible. 272 00:17:42,586 --> 00:17:48,896 Investigators immediately start 273 00:17:49,000 --> 00:17:50,655 looking for the cause of the crash. 274 00:17:53,586 --> 00:17:56,379 In the early days, their efforts take a frustrating turn. 275 00:18:00,517 --> 00:18:03,413 They recover the box containing the cockpit voice recorder, 276 00:18:03,517 --> 00:18:07,103 but the recorder itself has been thrown clear. 277 00:18:07,206 --> 00:18:12,137 It was difficult for us because we first, 278 00:18:12,241 --> 00:18:17,379 first found the case of the CVR very badly damaged 279 00:18:17,482 --> 00:18:21,896 and we could not find the, you know, the machine itself. 280 00:18:22,000 --> 00:18:24,620 Investigators need to know what 281 00:18:24,724 --> 00:18:26,482 happened to the pilots. 282 00:18:26,586 --> 00:18:28,172 Without the cockpit voice recorder, 283 00:18:28,275 --> 00:18:29,310 they have little to go on. 284 00:18:29,413 --> 00:18:32,724 So keep looking. Let's hope we can find it. 285 00:18:32,827 --> 00:18:42,482 Bodies recovered from the wreckage are brought 286 00:18:42,586 --> 00:18:44,551 to the offices of Athens' chief coroner. 287 00:18:45,896 --> 00:18:48,896 Autopsies add more mystery to the case. 288 00:18:49,000 --> 00:18:52,689 Everyone on board the plane was alive at the time of the crash. 289 00:18:54,034 --> 00:18:57,620 There were scenarios at the time 290 00:18:57,724 --> 00:18:58,793 that they had all died in midair. 291 00:18:58,896 --> 00:19:05,034 But the truth, they did not die from inhaling a toxic 292 00:19:05,137 --> 00:19:07,344 substance in the airplane or from an explosion. 293 00:19:07,448 --> 00:19:15,206 These people died on impact. 294 00:19:15,310 --> 00:19:21,827 But if the passengers were alive the entire flight, 295 00:19:21,931 --> 00:19:23,689 why didn't the pilot of the fighter jet 296 00:19:23,793 --> 00:19:26,793 see any activity inside the cabin, 297 00:19:26,896 --> 00:19:35,137 and who was at the controls as the jet circled over Athens? 298 00:19:35,241 --> 00:19:38,000 When investigators find tissue samples in the remains 299 00:19:38,103 --> 00:19:40,862 of the cockpit, they make a stunning discovery. 300 00:19:43,344 --> 00:19:46,379 The person at the controls of the plane when it crashed 301 00:19:46,482 --> 00:19:48,103 was flight attendant Andreas Prodromou, 302 00:19:49,517 --> 00:19:51,482 a last minute addition to the cabin crew. 303 00:19:51,586 --> 00:19:56,931 But why was he in the cockpit? 304 00:19:57,034 --> 00:19:58,620 Was he trying to save the plane, 305 00:20:00,379 --> 00:20:02,482 or did he deliberately fly it into the ground? 306 00:20:07,482 --> 00:20:10,379 Several days after finding the outer case of the cockpit 307 00:20:10,482 --> 00:20:13,931 voice recorder, investigators find the recording itself. 308 00:20:15,517 --> 00:20:18,448 When chief investigator Tsolakis listens to the final 309 00:20:18,551 --> 00:20:21,620 moments of the flight, it answers a vital question. 310 00:20:24,068 --> 00:20:25,586 Mayday, Mayday, Mayday. 311 00:20:25,689 --> 00:20:26,724 This was no terrorist act. 312 00:20:26,827 --> 00:20:30,620 Helios Airways flight 522. 313 00:20:30,724 --> 00:20:32,241 Prodromou was calling for help. 314 00:20:32,344 --> 00:20:36,793 Mayday, Mayday. 315 00:20:36,896 --> 00:20:40,379 Tsolakis hears five separate maydays on the tape, 316 00:20:40,482 --> 00:20:41,827 even though none of them were heard 317 00:20:41,931 --> 00:20:43,275 by air traffic controllers. 318 00:20:45,310 --> 00:20:50,000 From the first moment that they saw someone 319 00:20:50,103 --> 00:20:53,896 in the cockpit believe me, I was certain it was Andreas. 320 00:20:54,000 --> 00:20:55,275 He wasn't a coward. 321 00:20:57,000 --> 00:20:58,517 He knew something about planes, 322 00:20:58,620 --> 00:21:05,344 and he had the capacity to do something. 323 00:21:05,448 --> 00:21:17,344 In fact, Prodromou had his commercial pilot's license. 324 00:21:17,448 --> 00:21:19,310 It was the first step towards his goal 325 00:21:19,413 --> 00:21:21,137 of becoming a captain for Helios. 326 00:21:21,241 --> 00:21:23,655 It's the sort of day I'd like to be out flying. 327 00:21:23,758 --> 00:21:25,655 Oh you will Andreas. 328 00:21:25,758 --> 00:21:28,275 But all of his training 329 00:21:28,379 --> 00:21:29,965 wouldn't have helped save the jet. 330 00:21:32,241 --> 00:21:34,068 When he was seen at the controls, 331 00:21:34,172 --> 00:21:37,413 flight 522 had been in the air for almost three hours. 332 00:21:40,241 --> 00:21:43,241 And the reason the Helios plane seemed to veer away from the 333 00:21:43,344 --> 00:21:47,482 F-16s following it was because its left engine was out of fuel. 334 00:21:49,137 --> 00:21:51,689 No matter what caused the alarms to sound, 335 00:21:51,793 --> 00:21:56,103 the ultimate reason for the crash was simple. 336 00:21:56,206 --> 00:22:02,448 The DFDR and the CVR gave us absolute proof that the 337 00:22:02,551 --> 00:22:06,724 plane ran out of fuel and this was the cause of the crash. 338 00:22:06,827 --> 00:22:13,551 Scheduled as a ninety-minute flight, the plane 339 00:22:13,655 --> 00:22:16,931 didn't have enough fuel to stay in the air for over three hours. 340 00:22:18,241 --> 00:22:20,655 But why had the plane flown so much longer 341 00:22:20,758 --> 00:22:21,793 than it was supposed to? 342 00:22:25,034 --> 00:22:28,034 Tsolakis now knows who was in the cockpit of the plane 343 00:22:28,137 --> 00:22:30,275 and why it crashed. 344 00:22:30,379 --> 00:22:32,448 But to fully understand the mystery, 345 00:22:32,551 --> 00:22:33,862 he needs more information. 346 00:22:39,551 --> 00:22:41,655 His investigators uncover a suspicious 347 00:22:41,758 --> 00:22:44,655 history of maintenance issues with the Helios jet, 348 00:22:44,758 --> 00:22:47,724 issues that could help explain what happened on flight 522. 349 00:22:51,137 --> 00:22:52,965 Less than a year before the crash, 350 00:22:53,068 --> 00:22:55,655 the same aircraft had suffered a rapid decompression. 351 00:23:01,793 --> 00:23:04,827 Lazaros Temetzian worked on that flight. 352 00:23:04,931 --> 00:23:07,068 I was in the back of the aircraft at the time. 353 00:23:07,172 --> 00:23:10,862 There was a loud metallic bang, a clanging sound 354 00:23:12,241 --> 00:23:15,413 and the oxygen masks dropped in the cabin. 355 00:23:18,241 --> 00:23:21,379 Every step I was taking was difficult. 356 00:23:21,482 --> 00:23:24,482 It was hard to move, uh hard to breathe. 357 00:23:24,586 --> 00:23:28,172 In fact, I was, I was starting to pant, I was panting for air. 358 00:23:28,275 --> 00:23:31,620 As the plane began an immediate descent 359 00:23:31,724 --> 00:23:33,724 to 33-hundred meters, 360 00:23:33,827 --> 00:23:36,827 all Temetzian could do was remain strapped in and wait. 361 00:23:40,413 --> 00:23:42,655 Once the plane reached a safe altitude, 362 00:23:42,758 --> 00:23:44,655 Temetzian inspected the rear door 363 00:23:44,758 --> 00:23:46,137 and was shocked by what he found. 364 00:23:46,241 --> 00:23:50,689 I noticed that the aft service door 365 00:23:50,793 --> 00:23:51,965 was not fully locked. 366 00:23:53,655 --> 00:23:56,551 The hinges on the top and the bottom of the door 367 00:23:56,655 --> 00:23:58,827 were kind of displaced. 368 00:23:58,931 --> 00:24:02,034 I could pass my hand right through. 369 00:24:02,137 --> 00:24:06,724 There were no injuries and the plane made 370 00:24:06,827 --> 00:24:10,724 an emergency landing, and the door was inspected. 371 00:24:10,827 --> 00:24:13,620 But this wasn't the only problem crews had with this plane. 372 00:24:13,724 --> 00:24:18,172 We would record faults in the cabin logbook 373 00:24:18,275 --> 00:24:22,000 constantly and nothing would be done to rectify even these 374 00:24:22,103 --> 00:24:24,344 small little problems in the cabin. 375 00:24:24,448 --> 00:24:26,793 Engineers would take months to rectify 376 00:24:26,896 --> 00:24:29,517 even the slightest problem in the cabin. 377 00:24:29,620 --> 00:24:34,275 There were more recent problems as well. 378 00:24:34,379 --> 00:24:38,137 A Helios ground engineer tells Tsolakis that on the very day of 379 00:24:38,241 --> 00:24:42,758 flight 522, the 737 had another problem with its back door. 380 00:24:42,862 --> 00:24:45,068 When we checked the flight log for the trip, 381 00:24:45,172 --> 00:24:47,137 we saw that we'd have to do some unscheduled maintenance. 382 00:24:47,241 --> 00:24:50,034 The plane had arrived in Cyprus just after 383 00:24:50,137 --> 00:24:51,310 midnight on August the 14th. 384 00:24:52,724 --> 00:24:55,344 The cabin crew had heard loud banging noises 385 00:24:55,448 --> 00:24:59,413 and saw ice on the rear service door during the flight. 386 00:24:59,517 --> 00:25:02,103 It was scheduled to take off again just hours later. 387 00:25:05,896 --> 00:25:10,103 Soon after it landed, engineers began checking the problem. 388 00:25:10,206 --> 00:25:12,103 To make sure there's nothing wrong with the seal 389 00:25:12,206 --> 00:25:15,413 on the door, the engineers run a pressurization test. 390 00:25:17,482 --> 00:25:18,758 During normal flight, 391 00:25:18,862 --> 00:25:21,310 a plane's engines force air into the cabin. 392 00:25:23,172 --> 00:25:25,827 To ensure oxygen circulates during the trip, 393 00:25:25,931 --> 00:25:29,241 small valves in the rear allow some of it to leak out. 394 00:25:29,344 --> 00:25:35,896 A pressurized airplane essentially is 395 00:25:36,000 --> 00:25:38,724 sort of like a pressurized can. 396 00:25:38,827 --> 00:25:41,758 We pressurize the airplane so that the people inside can 397 00:25:41,862 --> 00:25:45,551 survive the environment that the airplane likes to operate in. 398 00:25:45,655 --> 00:25:47,172 Switching digital pressure control 399 00:25:47,275 --> 00:25:49,551 unit from auto to manual. 400 00:25:49,655 --> 00:25:52,551 Without the jet's engines running, 401 00:25:52,655 --> 00:25:55,034 the engineer uses the plane's auxiliary power 402 00:25:55,137 --> 00:25:57,413 unit to force air into the aircraft, 403 00:25:57,517 --> 00:25:59,758 and the cabin is pressurized for several minutes. 404 00:25:59,862 --> 00:26:05,206 It's like looking for a leak in a tire. 405 00:26:05,310 --> 00:26:07,724 In this case, what you're having to do is pressurize 406 00:26:07,827 --> 00:26:11,206 the aircraft, use a bar, a barometer essentially 407 00:26:11,310 --> 00:26:14,344 to monitor the pressure inside uh and look for leaks that way. 408 00:26:16,965 --> 00:26:19,206 But there's no indication any air 409 00:26:19,310 --> 00:26:20,896 is escaping through the back door. 410 00:26:21,000 --> 00:26:26,310 In this case, they felt that it was all right 411 00:26:26,413 --> 00:26:28,586 and they completed the test. 412 00:26:28,689 --> 00:26:33,896 The entire jet seems to be in good working order. 413 00:26:34,000 --> 00:26:36,862 After performing a series of additional routine maintenance 414 00:26:36,965 --> 00:26:40,275 procedures, the engineers signed off on their technical log. 415 00:26:41,862 --> 00:26:43,689 Investigators are faced with a dead end. 416 00:26:46,517 --> 00:26:48,137 An explosive decompression 417 00:26:48,241 --> 00:26:52,275 could have explained the tragic events of flight 522. 418 00:26:52,379 --> 00:26:55,758 If the oxygen had been suddenly sucked out of the jet, 419 00:26:55,862 --> 00:26:57,793 everyone onboard could have been overcome. 420 00:26:59,344 --> 00:27:03,103 But not only did engineers check the problem, when the F-16s 421 00:27:03,206 --> 00:27:06,655 approached the plane near Athens, no damage was seen. 422 00:27:06,758 --> 00:27:09,310 There was no indication that the fuselage was punctured. 423 00:27:11,068 --> 00:27:13,931 Investigators are still struggling to solve the mystery. 424 00:27:14,034 --> 00:27:17,724 What had overcome the passengers and crew of Helios flight 425 00:27:17,827 --> 00:27:22,344 522, and why was one flight attendant apparently unaffected? 426 00:27:24,275 --> 00:27:27,241 The discovery of one small switch holds 427 00:27:27,344 --> 00:27:29,172 the key to the entire crash. 428 00:27:29,275 --> 00:27:36,034 The crash of Helios flight 522 429 00:27:36,137 --> 00:27:39,413 is one of the most mysterious air disasters ever. 430 00:27:44,275 --> 00:27:46,275 Helios 522, do you read? Over. 431 00:27:46,379 --> 00:27:48,655 All investigators know for sure is that shortly 432 00:27:48,758 --> 00:27:50,862 after takeoff the crew stopped communicating 433 00:27:50,965 --> 00:27:52,413 with air traffic controllers. 434 00:27:52,517 --> 00:27:55,931 Helios 522. Over. Mayday. 435 00:27:56,034 --> 00:27:58,758 Then, after two and a half hours in the air, 436 00:27:58,862 --> 00:28:00,206 one of the plane's flight attendants 437 00:28:00,310 --> 00:28:02,586 was seen at the controls. 438 00:28:02,689 --> 00:28:05,793 Eventually the plane ran out of fuel and crashed, 439 00:28:05,896 --> 00:28:07,689 killing 1-hundred and twenty-one people. 440 00:28:10,965 --> 00:28:13,241 But investigators are stumped. 441 00:28:13,344 --> 00:28:15,586 They still don't know what had happened to the plane's 442 00:28:15,689 --> 00:28:18,517 captain or the rest of the crew. 443 00:28:18,620 --> 00:28:20,655 Tell me about what happened the day of the flight. 444 00:28:20,758 --> 00:28:23,620 They concentrate on the conversation 445 00:28:23,724 --> 00:28:27,000 between the pilot and the Helios engineer shortly after takeoff. 446 00:28:29,034 --> 00:28:31,793 As the plane passed through 37-hundred meters, 447 00:28:31,896 --> 00:28:33,448 an alarm sounded in the cockpit. 448 00:28:33,551 --> 00:28:36,724 Operations, this is flight 522. Over. 449 00:28:36,827 --> 00:28:40,172 Flight 522, what can I do for you? 450 00:28:40,275 --> 00:28:43,793 We have a takeoff config warning on. 451 00:28:43,896 --> 00:28:45,000 Pardon? 452 00:28:45,103 --> 00:28:48,758 Our takeoff config warning is on. 453 00:28:48,862 --> 00:28:51,827 Usually, the takeoff config warning 454 00:28:51,931 --> 00:28:53,517 is only triggered on the runway, 455 00:28:53,620 --> 00:28:56,034 but wreckage recovered at the crash site 456 00:28:56,137 --> 00:28:58,724 reveals no problems with the plane's flaps, 457 00:28:58,827 --> 00:29:01,931 landing gear or anything else that could trigger the alarm. 458 00:29:04,620 --> 00:29:05,931 So why had it sounded? 459 00:29:09,862 --> 00:29:13,241 Chief investigator Akrivos Tsolakis focuses on a small 460 00:29:13,344 --> 00:29:16,000 control panel found in the wreckage of the ravaged jet. 461 00:29:16,103 --> 00:29:21,931 Are you sure this is the way it was found? 462 00:29:22,034 --> 00:29:23,241 It hasn't been moved at all? 463 00:29:23,344 --> 00:29:25,655 We were lucky. 464 00:29:25,758 --> 00:29:28,206 Finding this panel which had the switch 465 00:29:28,310 --> 00:29:31,172 on the manual position was a major one. 466 00:29:31,275 --> 00:29:34,655 The P-5 pressurization panel ensures that 467 00:29:34,758 --> 00:29:38,241 passengers have enough air to breathe, even at high altitudes. 468 00:29:40,068 --> 00:29:43,448 Normally, pressurization takes place automatically. 469 00:29:43,551 --> 00:29:45,896 As the jet climbs, its engines force 470 00:29:46,000 --> 00:29:48,379 air into the plane as they power it through the sky. 471 00:29:50,310 --> 00:29:53,517 But when the pressurization switch is set to manual, 472 00:29:53,620 --> 00:29:56,034 both the captain and co-pilot are responsible 473 00:29:56,137 --> 00:29:59,000 for maintaining the cabin atmosphere using a controller. 474 00:29:59,103 --> 00:30:04,206 So explain again how you tested the pressure. 475 00:30:04,310 --> 00:30:05,896 I went into the cockpit. 476 00:30:06,000 --> 00:30:07,896 I turned the pressurization switch to manual. 477 00:30:09,896 --> 00:30:11,965 Tsolakis learns that during the early morning 478 00:30:12,068 --> 00:30:14,931 maintenance check on Helios 522, 479 00:30:15,034 --> 00:30:17,896 ground engineers had turned the P-5 switch to manual. 480 00:30:19,068 --> 00:30:21,448 That allowed them to use the onboard generators 481 00:30:21,551 --> 00:30:24,103 to test the pressure seals on the plane's rear door 482 00:30:24,206 --> 00:30:25,689 without starting the engines. 483 00:30:27,000 --> 00:30:28,931 When the test was over, 484 00:30:29,034 --> 00:30:31,241 they didn't turn the switch back to automatic. 485 00:30:31,344 --> 00:30:34,655 The procedure of pressurizing the aircraft 486 00:30:34,758 --> 00:30:37,068 has to do with setting the pressurization 487 00:30:37,172 --> 00:30:39,724 system from auto to manual. 488 00:30:39,827 --> 00:30:41,586 They were supposed to return 489 00:30:42,655 --> 00:30:45,482 the uh selector to the auto position. 490 00:30:53,620 --> 00:30:57,103 Several hours later, when the flight crew entered 491 00:30:57,206 --> 00:31:00,793 the cockpit, the pressurization switch was still set to manual. 492 00:31:00,896 --> 00:31:06,172 It's bright today. Are you almost through? 493 00:31:07,931 --> 00:31:09,241 Pardon? 494 00:31:09,344 --> 00:31:11,758 But neither the pilot nor co-pilot saw it. 495 00:31:14,482 --> 00:31:17,551 As a result, after takeoff the cabin would not pressurize 496 00:31:17,655 --> 00:31:22,793 automatically, and the higher flight 522 climbed 497 00:31:22,896 --> 00:31:24,482 the thinner the atmosphere became. 498 00:31:26,034 --> 00:31:28,172 Not turning the switch back to automatic 499 00:31:28,275 --> 00:31:30,103 was a deadly hidden danger. 500 00:31:30,206 --> 00:31:34,310 Are you sure this is the way it was found? 501 00:31:34,413 --> 00:31:35,689 It hasn't been moved at all? 502 00:31:35,793 --> 00:31:39,517 Tsolakis believes this panel could be 503 00:31:39,620 --> 00:31:41,931 the key to the disaster. 504 00:31:42,034 --> 00:31:44,793 Leaving one switch on manual could have led to all 505 00:31:44,896 --> 00:31:46,517 the other problems the plane faced. 506 00:31:48,931 --> 00:31:52,655 To prove he's right, he takes an unusual step. 507 00:31:52,758 --> 00:31:55,896 Four months after the disaster, he takes an Olympic Airlines 508 00:31:56,000 --> 00:31:59,103 737 on the same route flown by the Helios jet. 509 00:32:00,482 --> 00:32:03,000 If he's right about what caused the crash, 510 00:32:03,103 --> 00:32:06,310 this plane should react exactly like the doomed airliner did. 511 00:32:06,413 --> 00:32:09,344 Are we ready to go? 512 00:32:09,448 --> 00:32:13,827 When there is a complicated accident like this, 513 00:32:13,931 --> 00:32:17,862 I think reenact, reenactments should, should be performed. 514 00:32:17,965 --> 00:32:21,068 Of course it's expensive to have a jetliner flying 515 00:32:21,172 --> 00:32:27,793 for three or four hours but it is worth it if you have to come 516 00:32:27,896 --> 00:32:33,068 with some results which benefit to the overall investigation. 517 00:32:36,965 --> 00:32:45,068 Make sure the P-5 is set to manual. It's hard to see. 518 00:32:45,172 --> 00:32:46,448 In the cockpit, 519 00:32:46,551 --> 00:32:50,896 Tsolakis has the crew turn the pressurization switch to manual. 520 00:32:51,000 --> 00:32:54,413 A green light indicates it's no longer on automatic 521 00:32:54,517 --> 00:32:56,896 but in the bright glare of an early morning departure 522 00:32:57,000 --> 00:32:58,413 the light is hard to see. 523 00:33:01,551 --> 00:33:03,689 As the reenactment flight climbs, 524 00:33:03,793 --> 00:33:05,931 oxygen is thinning quickly in the aircraft. 525 00:33:07,827 --> 00:33:10,172 The same thing happened on the Helios flight, 526 00:33:10,275 --> 00:33:11,310 triggering an alarm. 527 00:33:15,482 --> 00:33:17,172 What is it? 528 00:33:17,275 --> 00:33:18,517 The takeoff config warning? 529 00:33:18,620 --> 00:33:23,896 The alarm sounded and that alarm was misinterpreted. 530 00:33:24,000 --> 00:33:29,689 Most of the flight crew they will never face 531 00:33:29,793 --> 00:33:34,655 an alarm with non-pressurization in all of their flight career 532 00:33:34,758 --> 00:33:35,931 because it's a rare event. 533 00:33:37,241 --> 00:33:39,068 Tsolakis confirms that the alarm went off 534 00:33:39,172 --> 00:33:42,172 because of the dangerously low air pressure in the aircraft. 535 00:33:42,275 --> 00:33:44,655 But he also discovers that the sound itself is 536 00:33:44,758 --> 00:33:47,034 identical to the takeoff config warning. 537 00:33:47,137 --> 00:33:49,413 We have a takeoff config warning on. 538 00:33:49,517 --> 00:33:53,448 But even if the flight crew did misinterpret 539 00:33:53,551 --> 00:33:56,413 the first alarm, they still had another chance to determine 540 00:33:56,517 --> 00:33:59,000 what the real problem was. 541 00:33:59,103 --> 00:34:02,517 At almost 5-thousand meters, the plane's master caution 542 00:34:02,620 --> 00:34:05,344 light flashed on and stayed on for almost a minute. 543 00:34:05,448 --> 00:34:08,241 We now have a master caution. 544 00:34:08,344 --> 00:34:11,517 But once again the pilots misinterpreted 545 00:34:11,620 --> 00:34:12,689 the cause of the alarm. 546 00:34:14,482 --> 00:34:16,896 The master caution light can indicate that the plane's 547 00:34:17,000 --> 00:34:19,206 systems are overheating. 548 00:34:19,310 --> 00:34:24,448 But it can also tell pilots the oxygen masks are down. 549 00:34:24,551 --> 00:34:27,344 In this case, it was doing both at the same time. 550 00:34:30,103 --> 00:34:31,379 But since the crew didn't think 551 00:34:31,482 --> 00:34:33,620 they were having pressurization problems, 552 00:34:33,724 --> 00:34:35,862 they focused on the plane's cooling systems. 553 00:34:35,965 --> 00:34:40,448 The alarm about the non-cooling 554 00:34:40,551 --> 00:34:44,620 was a side effect of non-pressurization. 555 00:34:44,724 --> 00:34:49,620 Actually it was not really that there was a high temperature 556 00:34:49,724 --> 00:34:55,482 inside the avionics bay, but it was the sensors 557 00:34:55,586 --> 00:34:58,310 that were supposed to measure the temperature 558 00:34:58,413 --> 00:35:01,827 and the pressure in that area sensed that something was wrong. 559 00:35:01,931 --> 00:35:05,724 On the recreation flight, 560 00:35:05,827 --> 00:35:08,068 investigators monitor instruments recording 561 00:35:08,172 --> 00:35:11,689 the same events occurring onboard their aircraft. 562 00:35:11,793 --> 00:35:12,965 At the same time, 563 00:35:13,068 --> 00:35:15,655 they also begin to feel the effects of the lack of oxygen. 564 00:35:15,758 --> 00:35:19,758 The first feelings you'd start to have 565 00:35:19,862 --> 00:35:21,517 were your ears would pop 566 00:35:21,620 --> 00:35:23,551 and you'd start feeling pressure in your sinuses. 567 00:35:23,655 --> 00:35:28,551 Uh as you climb higher, you begin to feel almost giddy. 568 00:35:28,655 --> 00:35:30,862 It's almost like having a couple of drinks of alcohol. 569 00:35:30,965 --> 00:35:34,241 The dwindling oxygen levels could also help 570 00:35:34,344 --> 00:35:36,689 explain some of the crews' bizarre behavior. 571 00:35:36,793 --> 00:35:41,586 Such as, when the ground engineer 572 00:35:41,689 --> 00:35:43,620 asked about pressurization... 573 00:35:43,724 --> 00:35:44,379 Can you confirm that 574 00:35:44,482 --> 00:35:47,689 the pressurization panel is set to auto? 575 00:35:47,793 --> 00:35:50,724 Captain Merten ignores the question 576 00:35:50,827 --> 00:35:52,793 and responds with one of his own. 577 00:35:52,896 --> 00:35:57,827 Where are my equipment cooling circuit breakers? 578 00:35:57,931 --> 00:35:59,931 You really don't notice it at first. 579 00:36:00,034 --> 00:36:03,310 It's amazing how subtle it can be in the early phases. 580 00:36:03,413 --> 00:36:05,724 They'd start feeling dizzy. 581 00:36:05,827 --> 00:36:09,379 They'd begin to lose the ability to think coherently. 582 00:36:09,482 --> 00:36:13,448 In a way it traps you in the situation. 583 00:36:13,551 --> 00:36:15,655 You can't react to anything. 584 00:36:15,758 --> 00:36:17,206 Eventually, you're gonna lose consciousness. 585 00:36:20,517 --> 00:36:22,724 Tsolakis believes that the captain may have been 586 00:36:22,827 --> 00:36:25,655 checking on the circuit breakers behind his seat 587 00:36:25,758 --> 00:36:29,551 when he and the co-pilot finally ran out of air. 588 00:36:29,655 --> 00:36:33,241 And, unlike in the cabin, the oxygen masks in the cockpit 589 00:36:33,344 --> 00:36:36,793 do not automatically deploy if the atmosphere begins to thin. 590 00:36:36,896 --> 00:36:44,482 Helios 522, can you hear me? 591 00:36:44,586 --> 00:36:47,482 On the other side of the locked cockpit door, 592 00:36:47,586 --> 00:36:49,000 no one in the cabin would have known 593 00:36:49,103 --> 00:36:51,034 that the plane was now flying itself. 594 00:36:52,482 --> 00:36:53,758 Nor would they have realized that 595 00:36:53,862 --> 00:36:56,896 a limitation of the passenger oxygen system had sealed 596 00:36:57,000 --> 00:36:58,655 the fate of everyone in the cabin. 597 00:37:00,379 --> 00:37:02,586 Passenger masks are supplied by a chemical 598 00:37:02,689 --> 00:37:06,758 generator above their seats, but the generators only produce 599 00:37:06,862 --> 00:37:09,310 enough oxygen to last about twelve minutes. 600 00:37:09,413 --> 00:37:15,103 Well the problem with the passenger masks 601 00:37:15,206 --> 00:37:18,862 is for one thing they're not designed to keep you 602 00:37:18,965 --> 00:37:21,172 oxygenated at a high altitude. 603 00:37:21,275 --> 00:37:24,275 What they're designed to do is give you enough oxygen 604 00:37:24,379 --> 00:37:25,758 so that you can survive 605 00:37:25,862 --> 00:37:28,793 until the pilots get the airplane down to a low altitude. 606 00:37:28,896 --> 00:37:31,103 In almost every event where we've had a decompression, 607 00:37:31,206 --> 00:37:32,344 that's been perfectly adequate. 608 00:37:32,448 --> 00:37:36,137 For those who did put their masks on, 609 00:37:36,241 --> 00:37:38,655 they would have remained conscious for several minutes 610 00:37:38,758 --> 00:37:40,068 until their oxygen ran out. 611 00:37:41,275 --> 00:37:42,965 Then they too would have passed out. 612 00:37:43,068 --> 00:37:47,172 Once you get up to 34-thousand feet, 613 00:37:47,275 --> 00:37:48,793 you're talking useful consciousness 614 00:37:48,896 --> 00:37:50,172 of thirty to sixty seconds. 615 00:37:51,862 --> 00:37:55,241 Most of the people, once the hypoxia begins to cause them 616 00:37:55,344 --> 00:37:57,482 to lose consciousness, they're just gonna go to sleep. 617 00:37:57,586 --> 00:38:03,379 Without a flight crew, 618 00:38:03,482 --> 00:38:07,206 Helios 522 would have continued to Athens on autopilot. 619 00:38:08,379 --> 00:38:10,448 When the crew didn't take control, 620 00:38:10,551 --> 00:38:12,793 the autopilot would have put the jet in a holding 621 00:38:12,896 --> 00:38:14,310 pattern as it flew over the airport. 622 00:38:20,655 --> 00:38:23,172 Exactly the same thing will happen on the reconstruction 623 00:38:23,275 --> 00:38:25,241 flight if cabin pressure isn't restored. 624 00:38:25,344 --> 00:38:29,241 Tsolakis asks the co-pilot to reset 625 00:38:29,344 --> 00:38:32,689 the P-5 panel to auto before the jet continues to climb 626 00:38:32,793 --> 00:38:35,793 to its cruising altitude of just over 10-thousand metres. 627 00:38:38,137 --> 00:38:41,551 Then, as it approaches Athens, Tsolakis also has 628 00:38:41,655 --> 00:38:45,724 an F-16 shadow the jet performing the recreation. 629 00:38:45,827 --> 00:38:48,068 He wants to confirm that it was Andreas Prodromou 630 00:38:48,172 --> 00:38:51,379 at the controls of flight 522 when it went down. 631 00:38:51,482 --> 00:38:57,241 We dressed one of our guys 632 00:38:57,344 --> 00:38:59,758 with the uniform of the steward. 633 00:38:59,862 --> 00:39:02,965 He came in, he sat on the captain's chair, 634 00:39:03,068 --> 00:39:05,793 and the F-16 was looking at him. 635 00:39:05,896 --> 00:39:08,310 He was confirming that it was exactly what 636 00:39:08,413 --> 00:39:10,068 he saw on the accident plane. 637 00:39:10,172 --> 00:39:15,068 The reconstruction also answers another 638 00:39:15,172 --> 00:39:18,103 question about the tragic fate of Helios Flight 522. 639 00:39:20,896 --> 00:39:22,275 The cockpit voice recorder 640 00:39:22,379 --> 00:39:24,896 picked up several strange noises. 641 00:39:25,000 --> 00:39:27,517 They're heard just before Prodromou enters the cockpit. 642 00:39:31,620 --> 00:39:34,896 Tsolakis confirms that these sounds were made by Prodromou 643 00:39:35,000 --> 00:39:37,931 using the electronic keypad to unlock the cockpit door. 644 00:39:38,034 --> 00:39:43,655 We confirmed all those items and during the 645 00:39:43,758 --> 00:39:48,137 reenactment flight and it was very, very useful. 646 00:39:48,241 --> 00:39:52,344 It filled a lot of gaps we had. 647 00:39:52,448 --> 00:39:53,482 Okay, take it down. 648 00:39:53,586 --> 00:39:59,896 For chief investigator Tsolakis, 649 00:40:00,000 --> 00:40:03,000 the reenactment flight has been convincing. 650 00:40:03,103 --> 00:40:05,862 There was no dramatic cabin failure. 651 00:40:05,965 --> 00:40:09,379 Instead, a series of small mistakes and misunderstandings 652 00:40:09,482 --> 00:40:12,379 had led to the worst air disaster in Greek history. 653 00:40:18,068 --> 00:40:20,275 Fifteen months after the crash, 654 00:40:20,379 --> 00:40:22,172 Greek authorities release the official 655 00:40:22,275 --> 00:40:27,379 report on Helios Airways Flight 522, but mysteries remain. 656 00:40:29,551 --> 00:40:31,068 What was happening in the cabin 657 00:40:31,172 --> 00:40:33,793 while the doomed airplane flew towards Athens. 658 00:40:35,034 --> 00:40:37,862 And why was Andreas Prodromou the only one 659 00:40:37,965 --> 00:40:39,655 conscious at the very end. 660 00:40:39,758 --> 00:40:50,689 The crash of Helios Flight 522 was the worst 661 00:40:50,793 --> 00:40:53,034 disaster in the history of Greek aviation. 662 00:40:54,517 --> 00:40:57,172 Like many crashes, it was a fatal combination 663 00:40:57,275 --> 00:40:59,931 of mechanical problems, and human error. 664 00:41:01,655 --> 00:41:04,689 The final accident report details a tragic series of 665 00:41:04,793 --> 00:41:07,758 oversights and false assumptions made by the flight crew. 666 00:41:09,000 --> 00:41:11,827 Problems that could have been easily prevented turned 667 00:41:11,931 --> 00:41:15,413 deadly for all 1-hundred and twenty-one people onboard. 668 00:41:15,517 --> 00:41:18,793 Where are my equipment cooling circuit breakers? 669 00:41:22,517 --> 00:41:25,586 Behind the captain's seat. Can you see them? 670 00:41:25,689 --> 00:41:33,413 But what the final report does not do is 671 00:41:33,517 --> 00:41:35,896 explain what happened in the cabin of the plane. 672 00:41:37,103 --> 00:41:40,137 What actions did the flight attendants take? 673 00:41:40,241 --> 00:41:43,103 And why was Andreas Prodromou still conscious 674 00:41:43,206 --> 00:41:44,758 after almost three hours? 675 00:41:47,827 --> 00:41:51,413 Interviews with Helios safety instructors and crew members 676 00:41:51,517 --> 00:41:53,931 paint a tragic picture of what may have occurred. 677 00:41:54,034 --> 00:41:58,275 Everyone, please your masks on. 678 00:41:58,379 --> 00:42:01,344 We're not sure what the trouble is but remain calm 679 00:42:01,448 --> 00:42:02,689 and please remain seated. 680 00:42:04,413 --> 00:42:07,344 Prodromou was sitting at the back of the cabin. 681 00:42:07,448 --> 00:42:09,034 When the oxygen masks fell, 682 00:42:09,137 --> 00:42:12,413 he would have waited for instructions from the cockpit. 683 00:42:12,517 --> 00:42:14,896 The flight attendants sitting at the front of the plane would 684 00:42:15,000 --> 00:42:18,103 have done the same, but none of them would have waited forever. 685 00:42:18,206 --> 00:42:22,448 We made it an issue at Helios 686 00:42:22,551 --> 00:42:25,517 to uh to emphasize that cabin crew 687 00:42:25,620 --> 00:42:29,413 should not entirely depend on their procedures, 688 00:42:29,517 --> 00:42:30,965 but to think on their feet 689 00:42:31,068 --> 00:42:34,000 and to adapt to any impending situation. 690 00:42:34,103 --> 00:42:36,862 In most depressurizations, 691 00:42:36,965 --> 00:42:39,344 the plane descends quickly. 692 00:42:39,448 --> 00:42:42,000 But as minutes passed on the Helios flight, 693 00:42:42,103 --> 00:42:43,689 the plane continued to climb. 694 00:42:45,068 --> 00:42:46,862 Unsure of what was going on, 695 00:42:46,965 --> 00:42:49,517 Prodromou would have tried to contact the flight crew. 696 00:42:49,620 --> 00:42:52,241 Captain? Captain Merten? 697 00:42:52,344 --> 00:42:54,241 But he gets no response. 698 00:42:54,344 --> 00:42:55,758 Can you give us an update please 699 00:42:55,862 --> 00:43:01,965 With no word from the cockpit, he would have soon 700 00:43:02,068 --> 00:43:04,862 realized that this was not a typical depressurization. 701 00:43:04,965 --> 00:43:07,793 When there was no call out from the cockpit 702 00:43:07,896 --> 00:43:10,206 and the aircraft didn't start an emergency descent, 703 00:43:10,310 --> 00:43:11,793 there was absolutely no protocol. 704 00:43:11,896 --> 00:43:13,379 It would be, they would be winging it. 705 00:43:13,482 --> 00:43:16,413 By now, Prodromou must have felt 706 00:43:16,517 --> 00:43:19,068 that something was terribly wrong. 707 00:43:19,172 --> 00:43:22,724 But to find out what the problem was he had to leave his seat. 708 00:43:22,827 --> 00:43:26,275 The oxygen available on a 737 is of course 709 00:43:26,379 --> 00:43:27,379 the drop-down oxygen. 710 00:43:27,482 --> 00:43:29,655 Ten percent of those masks are available 711 00:43:29,758 --> 00:43:33,068 for the crew in case of a de-pressurization incident. 712 00:43:33,172 --> 00:43:35,206 There are extra masks per every seat row. 713 00:43:35,310 --> 00:43:39,862 Taking advantage of the extra passenger masks, 714 00:43:39,965 --> 00:43:42,655 he could have made his way to the front of the plane, 715 00:43:42,758 --> 00:43:45,068 a process cabin crew called monkey swinging. 716 00:43:47,965 --> 00:43:51,241 But if more than twelve minutes had passed, his girlfriend 717 00:43:51,344 --> 00:43:53,379 and the other flight attendant may have still been 718 00:43:53,482 --> 00:43:57,448 in their seats and, like the passengers, overcome by hypoxia. 719 00:44:00,896 --> 00:44:02,862 But Prodromou was a scuba diver 720 00:44:02,965 --> 00:44:06,517 and a former soldier in the Cypriot special forces. 721 00:44:06,620 --> 00:44:09,724 His training may have helped him to stay alert a little longer. 722 00:44:11,517 --> 00:44:14,275 Andreas was not a coward. 723 00:44:14,379 --> 00:44:19,241 He was a brave person, fearless, brave and very calm. 724 00:44:19,344 --> 00:44:25,896 But to survive after the passenger oxygen system 725 00:44:26,000 --> 00:44:28,448 stopped working, he needed another solution. 726 00:44:29,586 --> 00:44:33,931 The 737 had four portable oxygen bottles. 727 00:44:34,034 --> 00:44:35,931 Each one could last more than an hour. 728 00:44:37,413 --> 00:44:40,724 All four bottles were found at the crash site. 729 00:44:40,827 --> 00:44:42,689 Three of them appeared to have been used. 730 00:44:43,965 --> 00:44:46,758 While the F-16 pilot saw Prodromou in the cockpit 731 00:44:46,862 --> 00:44:48,551 just before the crash, 732 00:44:48,655 --> 00:44:50,655 it may not have been the first time he had gone in. 733 00:44:51,931 --> 00:44:53,344 As he did at the end of the flight, 734 00:44:53,448 --> 00:44:56,517 he could have used the security code to unlock the door earlier. 735 00:44:56,620 --> 00:45:04,827 The procedure would be to enter the flight deck 736 00:45:04,931 --> 00:45:07,965 via the cockpit door, 737 00:45:08,068 --> 00:45:15,137 initially to bang on the door and then if no response is 738 00:45:15,241 --> 00:45:19,586 forthcoming to enter the code and enter the flight deck. 739 00:45:19,689 --> 00:45:23,551 During the accident investigation, 740 00:45:23,655 --> 00:45:26,655 DNA was discovered on an oxygen mask in the cockpit 741 00:45:26,758 --> 00:45:28,896 that matched the co-pilot's. 742 00:45:29,000 --> 00:45:31,862 It's possible Prodromou used it to try and revive him. 743 00:45:33,517 --> 00:45:37,379 You can still revitalize somebody 744 00:45:37,482 --> 00:45:39,689 for quite an extended period of time if you 745 00:45:39,793 --> 00:45:42,862 get to them before major brain damage has set in, and that's 746 00:45:42,965 --> 00:45:47,620 somewhat a variable situation depending on the person, 747 00:45:47,724 --> 00:45:51,137 depending on how long they're exposed to high altitude. 748 00:45:51,241 --> 00:45:54,827 But if he was in the cockpit earlier, 749 00:45:54,931 --> 00:45:55,862 why did he leave? 750 00:45:57,206 --> 00:45:58,310 No one will ever know. 751 00:45:58,413 --> 00:46:02,931 He probably was a little bit disoriented, 752 00:46:03,034 --> 00:46:04,379 a little bit confused. 753 00:46:04,482 --> 00:46:06,793 He's reacting a lot slower than he normally would. 754 00:46:06,896 --> 00:46:10,655 What was his state of mind? 755 00:46:10,758 --> 00:46:12,413 What was his physical condition? 756 00:46:12,517 --> 00:46:15,620 We think that he knew what was really the problem 757 00:46:15,724 --> 00:46:18,965 but is that the real situation? 758 00:46:19,068 --> 00:46:20,344 It's a real question. 759 00:46:20,448 --> 00:46:24,448 After three hours in the air, 760 00:46:24,551 --> 00:46:26,655 everyone who didn't have bottled oxygen 761 00:46:26,758 --> 00:46:28,896 would have been unconscious. 762 00:46:29,000 --> 00:46:33,379 As it approached Athens, flight 522 was now a ghost plane. 763 00:46:37,827 --> 00:46:41,241 Most of the victims, 764 00:46:41,344 --> 00:46:44,344 uh they probably still had heartbeats when the airplane 765 00:46:44,448 --> 00:46:47,758 crashed but almost certainly were in an irreversible coma. 766 00:46:47,862 --> 00:46:52,172 Hypoxia is no more painful than falling asleep, 767 00:46:54,241 --> 00:46:55,655 but for Andreas Prodromou 768 00:46:55,758 --> 00:46:57,482 the flight must have been a nightmare. 769 00:47:01,620 --> 00:47:04,241 As the F-16s roared to meet the jet, 770 00:47:04,344 --> 00:47:06,172 and with his oxygen running out, 771 00:47:06,275 --> 00:47:09,000 he must have known that he too was almost out of time. 772 00:47:10,413 --> 00:47:16,689 Yet, to the very end he didn't give up. 773 00:47:16,793 --> 00:47:23,206 Prodromou made one last attempt to save the plane. 774 00:47:23,310 --> 00:47:26,448 When he returns to the cockpit, the young flight attendant 775 00:47:26,551 --> 00:47:29,000 who dreamed of becoming a pilot calls for help. 776 00:47:30,206 --> 00:47:32,068 But no one can hear him, 777 00:47:32,172 --> 00:47:35,103 probably because the radio was still tuned to Larnaka, 778 00:47:35,206 --> 00:47:38,620 the airport on Cyprus where the flight had taken off. 779 00:47:38,724 --> 00:47:41,931 Fighting hypoxia and struggling to control an airplane 780 00:47:42,034 --> 00:47:44,275 larger than any he had ever flown, 781 00:47:44,379 --> 00:47:47,965 Prodromou was in an impossible situation. 782 00:47:48,068 --> 00:47:52,000 Even if he could have landed the plane, it was now too late. 783 00:47:52,103 --> 00:47:55,000 Flight 522 was out of time and fuel. 784 00:48:36,896 --> 00:48:40,241 There are pictures of Andreas in Cyprus, in the cemetery 785 00:48:40,344 --> 00:48:43,448 where he and his girlfriend Charis are buried side by side. 786 00:48:44,931 --> 00:48:50,896 As his father, my son is in front of me. 787 00:48:52,620 --> 00:49:03,586 Wherever I go he is always there. He left a very big gap. 788 00:49:07,965 --> 00:49:13,103 We will never get over it. 789 00:49:13,206 --> 00:49:15,827 There are pictures in Greece too. 790 00:49:15,931 --> 00:49:19,965 On the hill north of Athens where Helios flight 522 crashed, 791 00:49:20,068 --> 00:49:22,724 there are faded photographs of many of those who died. 792 00:49:24,000 --> 00:49:26,862 Bleached by the brilliant Mediterranean sun, 793 00:49:26,965 --> 00:49:29,827 they gaze over the rugged, ancient terrain, 794 00:49:29,931 --> 00:49:33,068 silent witnesses to one of the world's most bizarre 795 00:49:33,172 --> 00:49:35,000 and tragic airline disasters.